NORWAY,
under the rule of a Danish governor (during the 400‑year union with
Denmark
until 1814), was treated as a province. The legitimacy of the union
rested on
the dynastic principle, and the peace
treaty of Kiel ceded Norway to the Swedish king, due to
Denmark-Norway’s
participation in the Napoleonic wars on the side of France. Despite
being in
union with Denmark, the Norwegian administration and economic
development were
separate. At the time national identity was underdeveloped, while the
political
elites comprising of officials and wealthy merchants (patricians) were
demanding full independence and a separate constitution. An uprising
whose
ideological force was drawn from the “revolutionary” ideas
of the time, mainly
American and French, brought only limited progress. In the face of
Sweden’s
military supremacy, the new union was impossible to prevent. Even if
Norway had
to accept a Swedish king, the main
principles of the written
constitution, approved during the spring 1814,
remained almost unaltered.
THE
CONSTITUTION was strictly based on the principle of separation of
powers,
defining clear-cut spheres of competence between executive
(the king himself and the government appointed by him)
and legislature (parliament, in
Norway named Stortinget, henceforth
called the Storting). By contemporary
standards the constitution was markedly democratic. Suffrage applied
only to
males, amongst which only owner-occupier peasants (including those who
leased
land registered for taxation), officials, and the urban bourgeoisie who
had the
right to vote. This was the base for a sovereign nation-state,
legitimized by an elective constitutional democracy
where decisions on law-making
ultimately lay with free citizens in elections. The precondition for
this to
work was that those granted the right to vote had to be willing to use
the
right, that citizens regarded themselves as members of a national
community.
IN
THE SECOND HALF of the nineteenth century a national identity spread
itself
throughout broader sections of the population. The underprivileged
organized
and demanded the full rights as members of the nation. As a result men,
age 25
and older, in 1898 received the right to give their votes in general
elections
(parliamentary as well as local) and followed by women in the 1913.National identities were standardized across
social classes as a result of an improved infrastructure. The
school-system
also improved, and in the 1870’s, when the rotary press was introduced,
news
and political agitation spread even to the most remote districts.
FINALLY,
the struggles
about the union with Sweden intensified from the nineties,
strengthening the
national
identity. A climax of agitation and conflicts was reached in 1905 and
the union dissolved. During these
struggles the final steps were taken towards
a parliamentary system, i.e. a system in which the government
holds office
until it is defeated by a vote of majority in the
parliament.
THE
CHANGE from constitutional monarchy to parliamentarian democracy, was a
transformation in three stages:
The first
stage of the transformation was a gradual mobilization of groups that
in the 1814 gained the right to vote and the access to the election for
representatives to the Storting. This mobilization was leveled against
the power held by the state bureaucracy and from the 1884 onwards, the
king had to accept the government which was supported by majority in
the Storting.
The second
stage ran simultaneously with the political conflicts that brought the
union with Sweden to an end. The dissolution process was a climax in
the nation-building process. The union king was swept away, Norway
remained a monarchy, and from now on the government had to take full
responsibility for decisions made in the name of the executive.
Simultaneously conservatives, as well as liberals, during the years
1905–1908, accepted as a political norm that government has to
resign in a case of the vote of no confidence.
The third
stage, which partly took place in the period until 1932, was a process
of constitutional adjustment. At that time the main principle of
parliamentarian government was regarded as a legal norm, introduced as
customary constitutional law.
IN
THIS ARGUMENT my intension is to show more precisely how the transition
to
parliamentary democracy developed. Emphasis will be put on the
connection
between two processes, the nation-building and the democratization.
Explanatory efforts
HISTORIANS
opened the field of social science. From
the middle of the 19th century a view of Norway was created
as a
separate nation in relation to the partner in union, Sweden. Many
historians
were concerned with legitimizing the new nation-state with
presentations of
ethnicity, community of language, and common history. This involvement
was not
unique. In number of countries intellectuals, and particularly
historians, took
active part in the shaping of national identity. A common
starting‑point was
the “Young Europe” association, founded in the 1834 by Guiseppe Mazzini. Mazzini built on the idea of the right
of
“nations” to have a “state”, and seen in this
manner, the national
identification was a construction. The historians involved were thus
co-creators of Benedict Anderson`s «imagined communities».Especially
from
the 1870´s and the 1880´s the Norwegian historians
intensified the efforts for
explaining democratization in progress.
THE
MOST INFLUENTIAL HISTORIAN, Ernst Sars
(1835-1917), was inspired by French evolutionary ideas, particularly
those of Auguste Comte and Fustel de
Coulanges.
Some years later Halvdan Koht
(1873-1965) introduced a revision of the same paradigm. His concern was
to make
a synthesis of nation building and democratization on what he himself
regarded
as a Marxist basis. He emphasized that history was driven forward by
class
struggle. The working classes revolted only after the peasants. For him
the
independence in 1905 resulted from the long struggle for democracy of
the
peasants. On certain points his synthesis can be criticized for being
teleological, but the argument about the dissolution of the union and
the
ultimate breakthrough of parliamentarianism seen in same perspective,
was
relevant.
THE
FIELD OF HISTORY was strongly dominated by the paradigm introduced by
Sars and
Koht until the middle of the 20th century. Since then a new
generation of historians have tended to move away from synthesizing
evolution
theories and towards narrow sector analyses. Much of the research has
been
solely individual‑oriented. Other
historians raised the analysis to the sectoral
level, taking on only limited areas of the life of the society,
such as
party history, parliamentary history, and economic history.They were not
really oriented towards
syntheses, and above all their works suffered from deficient
conceptions of
democracy and of what parliamentarianism really is.
IN
THIS PERSPECTIVE the model developed by the sociologist Stein
Rokkan (1921–79) is a more fruitful contribution.
Rokkan had the synthesizing ambition needed, to treat the complex
matters we
are dealing with. He attempted to integrate basic preconditions, such
as
cultural variations, political traditions, and socio‑economic systems,
with
ongoing social conflicts. He was also concerned with that his model
assumed a
form that allowed for systematic comparison.
Rokkan proposed a number of central research areas.
One area was concerned with how the state penetrated into the
surrounding
society. Another are of his research was concerned with how the
population was
integrated into the state community: this encompassed recruitment to
the state
bodies, the school system, and the linking of the various districts
that came
from the expansion of the communications network. Yet another research
area was
concerned with the growth of a national “identity”, which
was in the first
place linked to the spread of literacy, the organization of teacher
training,
and the creation of state‑guided religious observance. Rokkan’s
other research
areas were concerned with how the population accepted the established
political
order (legitimacy), as well as participation in elections, membership
of
parties and organizations, newspaper readership, and so on. Rokkan
linked the
actual historical substance in nation‑building to tension between
centre and
periphery on the one hand, and a functional integration on the
other.
ROKKAN’S
CONTRIBUTION was to create relatively abstract models: “…
to develop multi-dimensional typologies for
configurational complexes; the typologies which tap significant
elements of
each historical-political context and yet allow wide-ranging
comparative
analysis, dimension by dimension.”
If we start from a contrary position, results obtained by means of a
comparative project, will make it easier to spot the most important
elements to
explain why for example certain political institutions developed in a
particular direction. In this respect historians will have much to
gather from
Rokkan’s contributions to comparative scholarship.
ONE
PROBLEM REMAINS, however. Rokkan did not always manage to construct his
models
in an empirically satisfactory way.With
references to later studies, he may be criticized for not sufficiently
dealing
with the deliberate nation‑building conducted by politicians,
academics, and
artists. He also ignored the nationalist activist ideology and the
political
actions which they’ve risen to in the period up to the 1905. In
my opinion the
determined nationalists were the ones who created the conflicts with
Sweden.
These conflicts in turn served to weld the nation even closer together
than
what it was. Rokkan´s perspective surely embraced extension of
suffrage to
under-privileged groups,
but on the other hand he can be criticized for not being sufficiently
concerned
with the transition to parliamentary democracy.
ØYVIND
ØSTERUD, in the subject area of nation‑building, brought the
nationalist
ideology and deliberate nation‑building into Rokkan’s model
by bringing in the theoretical positions developed within international
comparative research. Amongst other things, Østerud points out
how during the
growth of mass society, when traditional social bonds were torn apart,
the
Norwegian patriotism fulfilled a general need of belonging.
IN
MY ARGUMENT I will describe in more detail the process itself and its
connection to the nation building. The general explanation model of the
process
of democratization is based on the following terms: a lack of legitimacy and changing of the political
and legal norms.
In short:
As a result
of legitimacy crisis the
new constitutional norms came into being. More precisely a crisis
generated
competing political norms that
put the established system of government under pressure. In the
following round
the written legal norms are readjusted according to the new way of
thinking.
The constitution is either rewritten or the new norms are accepted as
customary
constitutional laws.
IN
NORWAY the crisis of legitimacy coincided with the two stages of nation
building. Until the 1884 the new norms challenged the normative
platform for
the dominance of bureaucracy, and until the 1905 the power that the
union king
at the time still possessed. In this second stage, the democratic
demands are
intensified and more systematically based on the principle of
parliamentarian
rule. This last transformation was to a certain degree an effect of
nationalistic demands.
AFTER
1905 it took almost thirty years until the norm of parliamentary
government
became a legal one. Behind this slow transition, which I interpret as a
legal adjustment, one can regard
alternating acceptance, first by experts on constitution law and
thereafter by
politicians. In my view of the events until the 1932, the
nation-building model
plays a less dominating role.
An extension of Rokkan´s model
The first stage
IN
REFERENCE TO the national identification and democratization, we have
to
emphasize the cultural gathering that occurred from the 1870’s. At that
time,
railways and roads opened up more or less the isolated districts for
the
outside world. By building the primary schools the education improved,
and the
distribution of newspapers and periodicals increased. In addition
people joined
in increasing numbers the country‑wide organizations. This led to a
process of
consolidation of opinions and attitudes, and it spread the feeling of
belonging
to the national community. It became easier to gather people from
different
areas and sectors of the society on common aims.
MY
CONCLUSION at this point is similar to what Robert
A. Dahl has pointed out on a comparative ground: Modern
market economy is not necessarily a pre-condition for
democratization; on the other hand education and communication are more
decisive factors.
Market integration also came relatively late in Norway; for agriculture
this
development was linked to investment into new machines, which in turn
led to
credit obligations and dependence on buying and selling. The latter
process
started in the 1860’s, but began to accelerate only after the turn of
the
century, and especially in the years around the First World War.
MY
ANALYSIS of the political aspects of
the same integration rests on Rokkan’s four stages:
allocation of rights (formal
incorporation), use of rights (mobilization),
own representation (activation) and
nationalization of lines of conflict in society (politicization).
Already in 1814 peasants dominated in terms of numbers within the
electorate,
and simultaneously they became eligible for election to the Storting.
But a
long time passed before the broad range of these voter groups used
their right,
they allowed the domination of the officials, not just administrative,
but also
political. But the transition to communal self‑government (1837) meant
that
peasants began to get better schooling as politicians, and from the
middle of
the century, more and more of them dared to be nominated for
parliamentary
elections.
FOR
THE FIRST TWELVE YEARS after 1814 rural districts provided the
Parliament with
47 % governmental officials and only 45 % classified as
‘peasants’ (Rokkan´s
category are “freeholders, other farmers, sheriffs and parish
clerks”). In the
years 1859–74 the corresponding proportions were respectively 17
% and 74 %. At
that time, a radical opposition to the old regime started mobilizing
and
demanded strengthening the right of local communities to take more
decisions on
their own. To maintain such goals, the opposing groups had to take
firmer
control over the central state power.
GRADUALLY
the peasantry challenged the social and political power possessed by
higher
officials. From the 1870´s the more concrete claim was made to
extend
parliamentary control by forcing members of the government to take part
in
parliamentary debates. Participation in elections in the 1884 boomed
because of
the struggles around this constitutional matter.
According to Rokkan, votes cast in percent of registered voters living
in rural
districts, during the period 1879 to 1882, increased from 45.2 % to
70.1 %.
The average level since 1814 had been about 45.0 %.
THE
AIMS PROMOTED by the oppositional groups presupposed a change in the
written
constitution. For more than twenty years the government stubbornly gave
support
to the king when he vetoed this constitutional Act. It was still not
clarified
if the king had the right to veto constitutional acts at all,
alternatively if
he possessed a suspensive (like that one he surely had in ordinary
acts) or an
absolute veto. In the 1884 the members of the government were condemned
by the
Court of the impeachment (named Riksretten),
in which according to the constitution the Storting held the key
position.The court was at this time only
contented to
reject the use of an absolute veto. It was not ascertained until the
1913 that
the constitution did not accept a veto at all.
FROM
1884 it was immensely difficult to form a new government that was not
at least
tacitly accepted by a majority in the Storting. Seen in this
perspective the
impeachment, and the political polarization it raised, was a first step
towards
parliamentarian government. This transition was also supported by the
existence
of political parties first organized during the constitutional
struggles, but
there was still no general agreement on the norm that a government has
to
resign after a vote of no confidence. As late as in the 1890´s a
conservative
government did not agree.
The second stage
MY
NEXT STEP is to show in more detail how national identification, an
active nationalism and democratization interacted in the years before
1905. One must
distinguish analytically between the phenomena of national
identification and
nationalism. The former basically involves
consciousness
of
belonging to a community which is created by history, and which is
characterized by a certain similarity in customs and forms of beliefs.
One may
appreciate this community, or at least parts of it, without necessarily
being a
nationalist. Nationalism, for its part, involves both an ideology and a
program
of action. The ideology endorses ideas about the people (folket),
the ethnic group, or indeed the race having special
qualities. In general the political goals will be either to conquer
territory
or to defend oneself against a conquest, or in some cases to break away
from a
larger state. The latter interpretation is relevant in this
context.
IN
MY ARGUMENT the following presupposition is important: despite
the fact that national identification was strengthened in the
course of the 1880’s, it was still not sufficiently aggressive to tear
Norway
out of the union. Only in the very
last phase of the union did a
spontaneous tide of opinion rise to embrace the entire nation:
“The fatherland
must tear itself loose!” Thus the national identification at the
time bore
nationalism in its womb. For the majority of Norwegian voters, this
involved a
temporary ideology of action, which grew only when the Swedes displayed
their
arrogance, and which receded after the dissolution of the union.
THE
POLITICS that created conflicts and drove developments towards the
break with
Sweden sprang in the first instance from a nationalist movement whose
socio‑economic
roots lay in certain parts of agrarian society. The movement manifested
itself
in the 1880’s in riflemen associations,
which constituted a popular militia of the radicals in the
constitutional
struggle until the 1884 and it was prominent again in the language
question
(the campaign for the use of New Norwegian (“nynorsk”),
and in a nationalist youth movement which was
consolidated in 1896 into the organization “Noregs
Ungdomslag”. Around 1905 this youth movement comprised almost
50 000
members, distributed among about 800 local groups, while there were
fewer than
70 local language associations.
THE
GROWTH of a nationalist ideology must be seen in the context of the
changes
society underwent during industrialization, from the middle of the 19th
century until the outbreak of the First World War.
The economic historical part of this interpretation is based on the
anthropological tradition established by A.
V. Chayanov’s classic work The Theory
of Peasant Economy, whereas the political-historical part is in the
first
instance inspired by the British historian Eric J.
Hobsbawm.
The form of agrarian nationalism encountered here is evidently not a
specifically Norwegian phenomenon. Drawing on comparative studies by
the Czech
scholar Miroslav Hroch, Hobsbawm shows
that such movements
often occurred when peasants came in contact with industrial society.
Nationalism became a part of a defensive ideology, directed against the
social
and economic transformations set in motion by industrialization and the
development of the market.
As a general trait, Hobsbawm suggests, nationalism had its greatest
appeal in
areas that were not yet fully integrated, but where industrial society
was
sufficiently near at hand for the inhabitants, and especially peasants,
to feel
threatened. This pattern suits Norway well. The core areas of
nationalism in
the last part of the nineteenth century covered a central belt of the
country,
which included the valleys and the inner fjord areas (“mountain
and fjord
Norway”).
OCCUPATIONS
in these cultural areas corresponded in many ways to the transitional
society described
by Hobsbawm. Specifically, subsistence agriculture was practiced; the
farm
constituted a social and economic unit, and the goal was to secure the
livelihood of the household for a year at a time. Socially,
politically, and
culturally the individual district communities comprised relatively
stable and
closed units. In terms of business activity, “mountain and fjord
Norway”
differed from both the fisheries districts along the coast, which were
strongly
linked to the market economy from early on, and the most industrialized
areas
around the Oslo fjord. In large parts of “mountain and fjord
Norway”, the
numbers involved in secondary activities were relatively small as late
as the
census of 1900.
This observation applies especially to areas where the first shooting
associations and the later youth movement had the bulk of their
members. The
same areas belonged to the strongest bastions of the New Norwegian
language.
Furthermore Venstre (bourgeoisie “Left”) regularly received
around three‑quarters
of the votes here in the Storting elections around the turn of the
century.
Generally speaking this nationalism sprung out of the old democratic
movement.
AS
POINTED OUT by Halvdan Koht, the demands for more democracy in the
1890’s are
to be regarded as expectations logically derived from the conflicts
until the
1884. From
the beginning, the union with Sweden had been a loose one. Norway not
only got
its own constitution, but also a separate parliament and a national
government.
Such institutions paved the way for an internal democratization that
ran
parallel to the mobilization of the less privileged sectors. On the
other hand,
the two states where linked together with a common king. He had the
right to
veto a parliamentarian Act three times, and he had much of control over
the
military and foreign affairs. Beside this his power was also in some
respects
strengthened by the Act of Union (Riksakten).
Economically the two states were linked together by the Union Trade Act
(Mellomriksloven).
ALREADY
from the 1830’s the king had tried often to make the union
closer. The
nationalists partly stiff-necked rejected all such attempts and
demanded
greater independence. After 1884 the Norwegian demands for increased
sovereignty and more democracy became stronger, and consequently the
king of
the union was regarded as the main hindrance. From the early
1890´s politicians
linked to the nationalist movement played an active part in pushing
forward the
conflicts with Sweden. In this struggle it seems as if the radicals
were driven
by a need to outbid each other in national fervor.
THE
REVISION of the party program in 1891, dealt with by the historian Rolf Danielsen, for example, resulted
from the pressure by a “noisy” opposition.
At the party’s national conference, they managed to push through
a vague
proposal about “an arrangement of the treatment of the diplomatic
question,
which introduces significant constitutional responsibility for the
Norwegian
state authorities”, which also meant that Norway should nominate
its own foreign
minister. The latter was a radical demand, which few, if any, Swedish
politicians, could have accepted at this point without declaring war.
The most
radical within Venstre began to call for full independence in the
1890’s. Høyre
(The Right Party), however, showed great respect for the union’s
existing
institutions. On the question of revising the relationship within the
union,
Høyre opted for negotiation rather than unilateral Norwegian
actions, right up
to the very last phase.
AS
A RESULT of these conflicts, the king had to loose power in the long
run, above
all his personal right to block ordinary parliamentarian Acts by using
suspensive veto.
Before the dissolution of the union in 1905, the Storting approved a
law
providing for a separate Norwegian consular service. The king refused
to
sanction it. Christian Michelsen’s
coalition government for its part refused to sign it, and left office.
The
situation was deadlocked, as no other party could take over. On the 7th
of June 1905, the Storting responded by declaring the union dissolved.
Broad
support for this decision proved that Venstre’s activism had also
won through
on the national level. Even Høyre, which in the 1890’s was
prepared to accept
the extension of the union’s institutions, accepted the
separatist solution. By
referendum on the August 13th, the voters unanimously endorsed the
decree of
June the 7th.
THE
BACKGROUND to the unanimity in 1905 is worth recapitulating. In 1902
negotiations with Sweden began. The following year, the two
countries’
governments issued a communiqué which proposed a separate
consular service. The
declaration was vaguely formulated, but it created great expectations
in
Norway. The conservatives especially looked forward to a solution of
this
issue. In the autumn of 1904 the Swedish Prime Minister, Erik
Gustav Boström, torpedoed all the hopes. He stated that the
Swedish negotiators had gone too far, and he interpreted the
declaration in a
way that underlined Swedish supremacy in the union. This interpretation
was
later called the Swedish “points of protectorate” (“lydrikepunktene”). This demonstration of power
ignited a patriotism
that can only be explained by reference to that which I call national
identification. Even those hitherto friendly towards the union reacted
violently.
WHEN THE QUESTION of Norway’s secession was put to a referendum
on August the
13th 1905, 386 208 people
voted in favor, and just 184 against.
Since the participation in this referendum was on more than 80 % a, a
majority
of men from the lower classes, also as members of the advancing Labour
movement, necessarily joined this national manifestation. At
the same time more than 250 000 women, who still had no right to
vote,
signed a petition where they gave support to the dissolution. The high
level of
participation in the referendum and the broad unanimity achieved,
confirmed
that the state and nation had merged in the direction of a
“symbiosis”
despite the fact that as soon as independence had been won, new
differences
quickly arose, particularly between socialist and bourgeois
parties.
TO
SUMMARIZE, it was due to the sharpened conflicts with Sweden, mainly on
demands
for a separate Norwegian consular service that the popular movement in
the
1890´s realized how the constitution generally gave too much
power to the king.
He also vetoed this reform, and by doing so he acted according to the
written
constitution that allowed him to decide, of course, without being held
responsible by the parliament. In the political situation that occurred
in 1905
the full responsibility de facto was transferred to the government, who
could
be held responsible by the parliament. In 1908 the same principle was
incorporated into the written constitution.
After having established this primacy on governmental matters leading
politicians from all parties could accept parliamentary government as a
political norm. I must underline that it is a historical paradox that
the
progressive democratization driven forward in the years up to 1905 was
closely
linked to a reactionary kind of nationalism.
The third stage
SEEN
IN A BROAD PERSPECTIVE, the last stage until the 1932 was a legal
adjustment to
hegemonic political norms. In 1918 the necessity of acceptance of vote
of no
confidence by the government was for the first time explicitly regarded
as customary constitutional law.Frede
Castberg,one of the most
prominent experts on constitutional matters, argued for the acceptance.
His
arguments were similar to those used by Knut Berlin, a Danish
colleague, a year
earlier. Nevertheless in Norway it took almost ten years until the
principles
of customary constitutional law were generally accepted and with that
the main
principle of parliamentary government also was practiced and accepted
as legal
norm.
AMONG
POLITICAL PARTIES decisive steps were taken in the late twenties. After
having
oriented the party ideology during First World War, towards communism,
the
Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet)
during
the years after 1923 found its platform among the national parties. In
1923 the
party broke with “Komintern”. The elections in 1927 gave
way for the first
Labour Party based government in Norway. After two weeks, this
government, the
first at any time in this country, resigned for a vote of no
confidence. Few
years later the party also joined national manifestations using the
Norwegian
flag when the Constitutional day was celebrated. The former communists
accepted
parliamentary democracy and regarded themselves as members of the
nation.
ALMOST
SIMULTANEOUSLY, from 1927 to 1929, a parliamentarian committee prepared
a new
law on constitutional accountability. In this draft it became
presupposed that
condemnation by impeachment would be the adequate form of reaction if
the
members of a government denied a resignation after a vote of no
confidence.
Ever since this presumption has been a main source for experts arguing
that
this norm is part of Norwegian customary constitutional law.Even to day it
remains to bring it into the
written constitution.
THE
PRESENT POLITICAL SYSTEM in Norway consists to a large extent of
political
practice, ordinary laws and customary laws. The written constitution
itself
gives a more accurate picture of the system of government in the 19th
century than that of today. As a consequence that constitution is a
symbol of the
same order as the flag: a pure national symbol, and as such a delivery
from the
past.
What will happen in the future?
THE
DEBATE on whether Norway should join the EU enables one to test the
strength of
nationalism and traditional democratic norms today. These questions
were raised
during the first referendum in 1972, when the majority also voted
against
membership of the EC, as it was named at that time. The opposition
comprised a
broad alliance. Some indeed thought along nationalist lines, believing
that
Norway should be kept for Norwegians and that Norwegian culture should
be
protected behind closed curtains. They were not many.
ANOTHER
GROUP was mostly concerned with democracy and the distance to where
decisions
would be made (“Brussels is further away than Oslo”);
democracy was felt to
work better within small units. Groups of urban radicals wanted as much
as
possible to maintain national controls over capital. National symbols
were also
used, and symbols occasionally played on many levels. This was the case
with
the badge “No to the sale of Norway”, with the flag in the
background. But the
bulk of the opposition comprised people concerned with preserving their
livelihood.
AS
THE QUESTION OF MEMBERSHIP reopened in 1994, protectionists once again
dominated the opposition to the EU, demanding the protection of
agriculture,
fisheries, and North Sea oil resources. Many skeptics also revived the
democracy argument. As in 1972, opposition embraced an unspecified
“fear of the
unknown” in addition to the motivations just mentioned; no one
knew what EU
membership entailed, much less what the union would look like in the
future.
Such an amorphous threat could mean that many seek a mental
“reinforcement” in
the use of national symbols. One of the country’s leading
handicrafts stores,
at Bø in Telemark, reported that the sale of traditional
costumes rose in
advance of the referendum of 1972, and that the same was happening in
1994.
IT
IS STILL AN OPEN QUESTION whether national identification is so strong
that it
can again transform itself into nationalism, as in 1905. We will have a
new
opportunity to address this question when the elite again in a near
future
occasion seek to maneuver Norway into EU. The answer is probably no,
because
large parts of the political elite have long practiced a kind of
national
deconstruction – to turn Rokkan’s concept on its head
– with the intention of
clearing the way for Norwegian membership of the EU. Leading
politicians,
especially within the Labour Party and the Right Party, have in recent
years
spread the idea that fewer and fewer problems can be solved within the
framework of the nation-state. At the same time Norway, like many other
countries, has undergone a cultural assimilation that crosses national
frontiers. Perhaps the historians of the future will write about not
only the
rise of the Norwegian nation-state, but also of its breakdown. It is
still an
open question whether the further steps towards European integration
will
revoke national feeling in many countries,
and Norway as well.
